

An Empirical Perspective on Moral Expertise: Evidence from a Global Study of Philosophers

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Abstract

Are philosophers experts in moral matters? This contested question is as old as philosophy itself and has recently attracted renewed interest. While it is widely accepted that philosophers possess superior analytic abilities regarding moral matters, scholars still debate whether they are also better judges of moral problems. We contribute to this debate by offering an empirical perspective on philosophers' beliefs regarding this question using a novel and global study among 4,087 philosophers from 96 countries. We found that most philosophers believe that philosophers possess an improved ability to both analyze and judge moral problems and that they commonly see these two capacities as going hand in hand. We also point at significant associations between personal and professional attributes and philosophers' beliefs, such as gender, age, working in the field of moral philosophy, public involvement, and association with the analytic tradition. We discuss the implications of these findings for the debate about moral expertise.

Keywords: Moral Expertise, Experimental Philosophy, Metaphilosophy, Moral Judgment, Moral Understanding

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Introduction

The question regarding the benefits of philosophy for its practitioners and general society is as old as philosophy itself. Plato famously argued for the advantage of philosophers in adjudicating moral matters, advocating their public role as philosopher kings. This discussion of philosophers' putative moral expertise has gained renewed attention with the increased research into bioethics. It emerged from the need to address the moral questions that stem from medical and technological developments of recent decades. Philosophers have been considered moral experts, who can assist in dealing with such questions, and there is growing evidence regarding their advisory activity on such matters (e.g., Schwartz 2010; Wolff 2011). However, it is still debated, even among philosophers themselves, whether and what sort of moral expertise philosophers possess.

While some reject the notion that philosophers have an advantage in adjudicating moral matters (e.g., Cowley 2005; 2012), overall the literature on this subject supports the idea that philosophers possess superior moral expertise of some sort. However, the nature of such moral expertise is contested. On the one hand, some affirm the Platonic view and argue for philosophers' privileged ability to analyze moral problems and to judge what ought to be done (e.g., Singer 1972). On the other hand, others subscribe to a narrow view of philosophers' moral expertise, which pertains to abilities to analyze and conceptualize moral problems, but not to judge what their solution is (e.g., Archard 2011).

Inspired by the experimental philosophy literature, we take a different approach to the theoretical dispute about philosophers' moral expertise. We offer an empirical perspective on this debate by utilizing a novel and global study among 4,087 philosophers from 96 countries. This study is the most comprehensive study to date on philosophers' views in terms of number of participants and international diversity. Our data offers a worldwide picture of what philosophers believe regarding their moral expertise and provides insights into the sources of existing disagreement. The analysis of the data is guided by a conceptual framework, which maps their views on moral expertise across two dimensions of philosophers' putative moral capacities: their ability (1) to analyze; and (2) to judge moral problems.

We analyze three dimensions of philosophers' beliefs regarding moral expertise. First, we explore the distribution of their views on this subject. Our findings suggest that the vast majority of philosophers evaluate the ability of philosophers to analyze moral problems favorably, while the point of contention pertains to whether philosophers are also capable

adjudicators of such problems. The findings indicate that the view that philosophers possess the ability for moral judgment is significantly the most common one among philosophers.

Second, we explore the relationship between what philosophers believe about their capacities to analyze and to judge moral problems. Our findings reveal a strong and linear association between these beliefs. The relationship suggests that an increase in one's belief in the moral analysis ability of philosophers is associated with an increase in moral judgment ability throughout the range of beliefs in moral analysis – from low levels to high. It indicates that enhanced ability for moral analysis is not merely a necessary condition for judgment ability. Moreover, this relationship is inconsistent with the view that philosophers possess only enhanced moral analysis capacity, but not equivalent judgment ability.

Finally, we explore the predictors of philosophers' beliefs about moral expertise at the personal and professional levels. Notably, philosophers in the field of moral philosophy, and those who are publicly involved in advisory activities, tend to evaluate philosophers' moral judgment capacity as stronger, while analytic philosophers tend to reject this view.

These findings offer a sociological review of philosophy scholars. They shed light on what philosophers think about their profession and potential contribution to society. We further discuss the potential implications of our findings for the debate over philosophers' moral expertise, suggesting that they might offer evidence in favor of philosophers' ability to judge moral problems. Yet, this evidence should be cautiously considered, and further research is required to substantiate it.

In the following section, we review the debate over philosophers' moral expertise and present our conceptual framework. Next, we present the method of the study, which uses the conceptual framework to operationalize philosophers' beliefs on this subject. In the Results section we present our findings and, in the concluding section, we discuss the implications of our findings for the literature on moral expertise, and more generally for experimental philosophy.

Conceptual Framework

The literature commonly distinguishes between two types of moral expertise. Narrow moral expertise assumes an enhanced ability to analyze, understand, and conceptualize moral problems. Broad moral expertise encompasses the narrow version, and further assumes

enhanced ability to know what is morally right (Steinkamp, Gordijn, and ten Have 2008). In other words, “there is the expert judge, who does a better job of arriving at true moral judgments... and the expert in moral analysis who has greater than normal insight into the nature of morality” (Driver 2013, 280).³

Scholars have debated which of these two types of moral expertise philosophers possess. Notably, in his widely-referred paper, Singer (1972) presents a representative argument in favor of philosophers’ broad moral expertise. Due to their training and profession, philosophers possess more comprehensive knowledge of moral theories, better logical skills, and more time to think about moral matters. These possessions grant them an epistemic advantage in judging moral problems. Forming a sound moral judgment is not an easy task; it includes gathering information, selecting what information is relevant, and combining this information with the relevant moral knowledge. As he argues, “someone familiar with moral concepts and with moral arguments, who has ample time to gather information and think about it, may reasonably be expected to reach a soundly based conclusion more often” (Singer 1972, 116–17). In Singer’s view, the moral expertise of philosophers is a product of a division of labor, not merely of some special inborn talent.

Other scholars have rejected Singer’s argument and contended that philosophers are moral experts only in the narrow sense. Philosophers are not moral problem solvers who can point to what ought to be done, but rather observers or inquirers who can enhance the thinking on the moral problem at hand. Their experience with different moral questions, arguments, and perspectives renders them more sensitive to a situation’s laden values, to those who might be affected by it, and to the moral difficulties of possible solutions (Føllesdal 2004).

These scholars who advocate the narrow view of moral expertise ground their arguments on different meta-ethical standpoints. Archard (2011), for example, argues that philosophers rely on common-sense morality as they construct their judgments based on sets of moral principles of ordinary people. By doing so, philosophers assume that they do not command moral knowledge that is not commanded by others, and hence they do not assume an epistemologically privileged position regarding the judgment of moral matters. They are not moral experts in the broad sense. Kovács (2010) arrives at a similar conclusion based on value-pluralism. According to value-pluralism, since there are several incommensurable moral values, each moral problem might have several legitimate solutions. Philosophers cannot settle

³ Throughout the paper, we will use the terms moral understanding and moral analysis interchangeably.

which of these solutions is the right course of action, and hence, cannot be considered as moral experts in the broad sense.

As might be expected from the dialectical nature of the discipline, others have addressed the challenges presented by the advocates of the narrow view and offered additional arguments in favor of the broad view (e.g., Gordon 2014; Vogelstein 2015; Priaux, Weinel, and Wrigley 2016). Gesang (2010), for example, argues that while philosophers rely on moral intuitions of ordinary people to form moral judgments, knowledge of moral theories is also crucial for their formulation. Because philosophers have a significant advantage in this regard, they are moral experts in a broad sense, at least as far as they and ordinary people share the same preliminary moral intuitions.

From a different angle, Niv (forthcoming) argues that the narrow view ignores the fundamental epistemological connection between the capacities to understand (or analyze) and judge. Regularly, he claims, we believe that those who better understand X are more likely to accurately judge X. A physician who is better able to diagnose our problem will be better to judge how to treat us. Niv claims that the supporters of the narrow view fail to justify why this understanding-judgment connection does not apply to the moral domain. If philosophers have an improved ability to analyze moral problems, we should acknowledge their accompanying advantage in judging such problems.

It is noteworthy that besides the broad and narrow views, some argue that philosophers are not moral experts at all. Cowley (2005; 2012), for example, claims that philosophers do not have any epistemologically privileged position regarding moral matters compared with non-philosophers. Yet, this view is not common, and most scholars hold that philosophers possess moral expertise to some degree.

While the above is not an exhaustive review of the debate, we suggest that the views of philosophers' moral expertise can be classified using a two-dimensional matrix (see Figure 1). The dimensions capture the stances regarding philosophers' superior ability to analyze and judge moral problems. The view that philosophers are not moral experts (e.g., Cowley 2012) holds that they are neither better moral judges nor better moral analyzers. The narrow view of moral expertise (e.g., Archard 2011) maintains that while philosophers are better moral analyzers, they are not better moral judges. The broad view of moral expertise (e.g., Singer 1972) posits that they are better moral analyzers as well as judges. Lastly, the matrix points to the logical possibility that philosophers possess superior moral judgment but no superior moral

analysis ability, which appears unfeasible, and indeed we do not identify any support for such an argument in the literature.

		Superior moral analysis	
		<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Superior moral judgment	<i>Yes</i>		Broad moral expertise
	<i>No</i>	No moral expertise	Narrow moral expertise

Figure 1. Matrix of the views of philosophers' moral expertise

The matrix reflects a connection between the two dimensions in this debate: Improved ability to analyze moral problems is a *necessary* condition for improved moral judgments. The debate between the narrow and broad views is a debate on whether an improved moral analysis is not only *necessary* but also a *sufficient* condition for improved moral judgment. On the one hand, as the narrow view holds, an improved moral analysis might not be a sufficient condition for improved moral judgment: The two dimensions are unrelated as the former does not imply the latter. On the other hand, as the broad view holds, the two capacities might be positively linked: improved moral analysis corresponds to improved moral judgments. The following hypotheses formulate these two competing answers to the sufficiency question:

H₁: *Philosophers' beliefs about moral analysis and judgment capacities are unrelated.*

H₂: *Philosophers' beliefs about moral analysis and judgment capacities are positively associated.*

Our main purpose in this paper is to offer empirical insights to the debate over philosophers' moral expertise, using a novel international dataset of philosophers' beliefs. We explore three aspects. First, by mapping philosophers' beliefs regarding the two dimensions of moral expertise, we wish to reflect the distribution of philosophers' stances on this theoretical debate. Second, we explore the relationship between beliefs in moral analysis and moral judgment abilities, allowing us to test our hypotheses. Finally, we identify several predictors of these philosophers' views across personal and professional attributes.

Method

Sample and Distribution

The study included scholars who published philosophy or ethics articles as they are categorized by the Web of Science database between the years 2010-2020. In total 139,446 records were retrieved from the database. The records were written in 33 languages, with most of them (72%) in English. However, only 87,189 (62.5%) of these records contained one or more email addresses. To assess the validity of these records and exclude non-philosophers, records were separated into two sub-sets: single author's records (68,564 / 78.6%) and multiple authors' records (18,625 / 21.4%). We manually searched online for the professional identity of 100 randomly selected email addresses from each group. We found that the sample of multiple authors' records consisted of fewer philosophers than the sample of single-authors (28% vs. 79%, respectively. For 15% of the single-author's list and 11% of the multiple authors list, no information was found). These results are not surprising due to the publishing culture in the discipline. Based on this preliminary analysis, only single author's records were used for this study. After removing duplicate email addresses, the list included 41,675 unique email addresses to which invitations to participate were sent. See Table 1 for a summary of the selection procedures.

In total, 35,659 email addresses received the invitation to participate in our study, after excluding inactive email addresses. Because some scholars have more than one email address, we used first and last names matches to estimate the number of scholars on our list, which resulted in 30,782 individual scholars. To further estimate the number of philosophers in this list, we used the results of our preliminary manual search of randomly sampled single author records, which suggested that 79% of the records belong to philosophers and for 15% no professional information was found. Thus, we estimate the total number of philosophers on our list is between 24,318 (79% of 30,782) to 28,935 (94% of 30,782, if we assume all the unknown email addresses belong to philosophers).

Table 1. Summary of the selection procedure

Retrieved records	
<i>(Records of philosophy or ethics articles, indexed by the Web of Science database, published between the years 2010-2020)</i>	
Retrieved records	139,446
Records contained email address/es	87,189
Number of authors per record	<i>Single author: 68,564 (78.6%)</i> <i>Multiple authors: 18,625 (21.4%)</i>
Estimated percentage of philosophers	<u><i>Single author records</i></u> 79% philosophers 6% non-philosophers 15% unknown <u><i>Multiple authors records</i></u> 28% philosophers 61% non-philosophers 11% unknown
Final distribution list	
<i>(Only single author records were used to compile the final distribution list)</i>	
Unique email addresses	41,675
Valid email addresses	35,659
<i>(excluding inactive email addresses)</i>	
Estimated number of individual scholars	30,782
<i>(excluding potential multiple email addresses per scholar)</i>	
Estimated number of philosophers invited	24,318 up to 28,935

Invitations were sent during May and June 2020. Participants were asked to fill out an online questionnaire using the Qualtrics platform. The questionnaire was in English, and focused on the public role of philosophers and their views on this topic. The survey was closed on 1st July 2020. After excluding non-philosopher participants, 4,087 full responses to the questionnaire were obtained. The completion rate, calculated based on the estimated number of philosophers in the invitation list, is between 14.12% to 16.81% (for a full description of the selection procedure and the completion rate calculations, see Appendix I).

Participants

Table 2 summarizes the participants' personal and professional backgrounds. As the table indicates, only 24.22% ($n = 990$) of the respondents are women, which reflects the current gender gap in the discipline (Schwitzgebel and Jennings 2017; Conklin, Artamonova, and Hassoun 2020). The average respondent is 50.2 years old ($SD = 13.6$), while the youngest is 20 years old and the oldest is 93. Respondents reside in 96 countries, but approximately 75% of them are from a smaller list of 16 countries. Not surprisingly, the largest number of respondents is from the United States ($n = 1,012$, 24.76%). Most respondents, 72.33% ($n = 2,956$) are academic professors at different ranks and others are adjunct professors,

postdoctoral researchers, Ph.D. students, independent scholars, or hold other positions. Most respondents (53.85%, $n = 2,201$) hold a position in a philosophy department. Others are associated with a wide range of departments and schools, for example, law schools, political science, sociology, psychology, literature, history, and economics departments.

We have a limited ability to determine how representative this sample is. Since the actual characteristics of the population of philosophers worldwide are unknown, we lack comparable standards. Comparing to samples of previous studies of philosophers cannot solve this problem as such studies suffer from a similar problem or focus on a narrower population, e.g., philosophers in English-speaking countries. However, we were able to conduct several analyses to assess the potential for selection bias either due to attrition or self-selection to respond. These analyses provide no evidence for self-selection to respond to our questionnaire. However, among those who responded we do find relatively lower attrition among men and analytic philosophers, and higher attrition among publicly involved philosophers. The latter finding is not surprising given that more involved philosophers faced a longer version of the questionnaire. Therefore, our sample potentially over-represents men and analytic philosophers, and underrepresents more involved philosophers. These analyses enable us to rule out some sources of selection bias, but not dismiss it completely (see further description of these analyses in Appendix I).

Table 2. *Participants' Personal and Professional Backgrounds.*

	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>		<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
Gender			Country of Residence (Top 16)		
Men	3,060	74.87	United States	1,012	24.76
Women	990	24.22	Italy	325	7.95
Other	37	0.91	United Kingdom	271	6.63
Age			Spain	197	4.82
20-29	101	2.47	Canada	182	4.45
30-39	931	22.78	Germany	174	4.26
40-49	1,133	27.72	Brazil	161	3.94
50-59	893	21.85	Russia	118	2.89
60-69	598	14.63	Australia	94	2.3
70-79	344	8.42	Israel	94	2.3
80+	87	2.13	France	81	1.98
Institution*			Argentina	75	1.84
University	3,393	83.02	Poland	70	1.71
Research Institute	348	8.51	Mexico	64	1.57
College	268	6.56	Colombia	63	1.54
Private company/business	125	3.06	Netherlands	63	1.54
NGO	122	2.99	Field of Expertise*		
Government agency/ministry	78	1.91	Moral Philosophy	1,412	34.55
Other	247	6.04	Political Philosophy	1,208	29.56
Rank			Epistemology	932	22.8
Professor Emeritus	260	6.36	Philosophy of Science	883	21.61
Full Professor	1,294	31.66	Metaphysics	860	21.04
Associate Professor	864	21.14	Aesthetics	475	11.62
Assistant Professor	538	13.16	Logic	388	9.49
Postdoctoral researcher	331	8.1	Other	1,827	44.7
Ph.D. student	124	3.03	Philosophical Tradition*		
Adjunct professor	187	4.58	Analytic	1,994	48.79
Independent researcher	285	6.97	Continental	1,696	41.5
Other	204	4.99	Intellectual History	1,157	28.31
Department*			Other	716	17.52
Philosophy	2,201	53.85	None	239	5.85
Political Science	264	6.46	<i>*Choosing multiple options is possible</i>		
Bioethics	176	4.31			
Bioethics/Medicine	170	4.16			
Other	1,135	27.77			

Measurements

Moral Analysis and Moral Judgment. Respondents' beliefs regarding philosophers' moral expertise were based on their responses to four statements about philosophers' capacities ranging from 1 (not having such capacities) to 7 (extensively having them). Three statements,

about philosophers' ability to (1) identify decisions that have moral aspects or implications, (2) identify the moral values at stake or in conflict, and (3) map the moral implications of different courses of action, were jointly used to compute (by a simple mean) an index for respondents' belief in philosophers' moral analysis capacity. Responses to these three statements are highly correlated (Cronbach's alpha = 0.94). Respondents' belief in philosophers' moral judgments was based on their responses to the statement that philosophers can point out the morally correct decision/action (see Appendix II for the exact wording).

Personal and Professional Attributes. We examine two personal attributes: age and gender; and four professional attributes: respondents' affiliation to a philosophy department ($n = 2,201$, 53.85%), working in the field of moral philosophy, including meta-ethics ($n = 1,412$, 34.55%), and association with the analytic ($n = 1,994$, 48.79%) or continental ($n = 1,696$, 41.5%) traditions. All these factors were constructed as a dummy variable (yes/no answer). Additionally, participants were asked to report their involvement in public policy or other advisory activities. For this purpose, they were asked to write down up to twelve activities in which they were consulted by various institutions or organizations due to their professional expertise as philosophers (see Appendix II for the exact question wording). 66.09% of respondents ($n = 2,701$) reported not taking any part in such activities. The remaining are ordered in decreasing proportions from 12.89% ($n = 527$) who reported one such activity down to 0.05% ($n = 2$) who reported twelve activities (*Median*=0, *Mean*=0.85, *SD*=1.59).

Results

Views of Moral Expertise

Figure 2 presents a scatterplot of philosophers' responses regarding their ability to analyze (X-axis) and judge (Y-axis) moral problems. As Figure 2 shows, most respondents are concentrated in the higher scores of the moral analysis variable (right of center), providing preliminary, yet clear evidence for a strong collective belief in philosophers' capacity to understand moral problems (*Median*=6, *Mean*=5.78, *SD*=1.30). On the other hand, the spread of respondents across the values of the moral judgment variable (y-axis) indicates that the belief in philosophers' capacity to judge moral problems is more contested, reflected by a lower average ranking and greater variance (*Median*=5, *Mean*=4.45, *SD* = 1.77).




Figure 2. Beliefs regarding philosophers' moral analysis and judgment capacities. The views of philosophers' moral expertise are colored by rough classification (ranks greater than 4 are considered as positive, i.e., philosophers possess the attributed ability). Points are jittered.

As a preliminary analysis, we coded the observations based on the four categories of the conceptual framework. For this purpose, the moral analysis and judgment rankings were each divided into two values: Scores larger than 4 were coded as “belief” in the ranked capacity, while scores equal to or less than 4 were coded as “rejection” of the ranked capacity.⁴ The colored points in Figure 2 present a visual representation of this coding. Based on this coding we can visually evaluate the proportion of support in each of the views regarding moral expertise. 49.45% of the respondents ($n = 2,021$, 95% CI = $\pm 1.54\%$) hold that philosophers possess broad moral expertise, which reflects belief in both their moral analyzing and judging capacities. Second, 38.88% of respondents ($n = 1,589$, 95% CI = $\pm 1.5\%$) hold that philosophers possess narrow moral expertise, which reflects belief in their moral analyzing capacity but not in their moral judging capacity. Third, only 10.72% of respondents ($n = 438$, 95% CI = $\pm 0.94\%$) hold that philosophers do not possess moral expertise – neither moral analyzing nor judging capacities. Only a tiny fraction (0.95%, $n = 39$) indicated that philosophers possess judging capacity but not analyzing capacity, which is manifested in high scores for their judging

⁴ Score 4 is the exact middle score in the ranking scale, indicating an indecisive opinion. For this purpose, we considered it as a score that represents a skepticism or negative view regarding the ranked capacity. It is noteworthy that this calculation is favorable to the narrow view. Less conservative calculation in which the scores of 4 for moral judgment are equally split change the proportion of each view: 58.87% for the broad view ($n = 2,406$), 29.46% for the narrow view ($n = 1,204$), 9.4% for no moral expertise ($n = 384$), and 2.28% for judgment without analysis ($n = 93$).

capacity and low scores for their analyzing capacity. The differences between these four proportions are statistically significant.

This picture stresses that the crux of the dispute is about the sufficiency of improved moral analysis for improved moral judgment. Almost 90% of respondents maintain that philosophers possess a high ability to analyze moral problems. However, they disagree on whether it is also accompanied by a high ability to judge moral problems: While the biggest group of respondents maintains that it is (supporters of the broad view), the group of respondents who rejects this idea (supporters of the narrow view) is not negligible.

Moral Analysis and Moral Judgment

So far, we have only described the distribution of philosophers' beliefs. Now, we take a closer look at the relationship between beliefs regarding moral analyzing and judging capacities. Note that this examination does not rely on direct answers of respondents regarding the relationship between the two capacities. Rather, we infer each respondent's view based on the responses to the two questions. This tests whether respondents' beliefs regarding philosophers' moral judgment ability are statistically associated with their beliefs regarding philosophers' moral analysis ability.

Figure 3 visually presents the relationship between beliefs regarding moral analysis and judgment capacities. It offers a preliminary, yet very clear, impression of how these two capacities are related. While each respondent takes a different stand regarding philosophers' moral expertise, an overall trend emerges: The blue line represents a linear estimation of the relationship between the two capacities. It shows a positive and strong relationship between the two: As respondents rank philosophers' ability to analyze moral problems more highly, they also tend to rank philosophers' ability to judge moral problems as higher.

The red line in Figure 3 represents an attempt to capture the relationship between the two dimensions, relaxing the linearity assumption. In other words, it enables us to assess the functional form of this relationship. As Figure 3 reveals, the two lines (the linear and nonlinear regression lines) almost fully overlap. This analysis supports the proposition that the relationship between moral analysis and judgment capacities is indeed positive and linear. The strong linear relationship found suggests that an increase in moral analysis ability is associated with moral judgment ability throughout the range of moral analysis – from low levels to high.

It indicates that enhanced moral analysis is not merely a necessary condition for judgment ability. Had it been only a necessary condition, a nonlinear relationship would be expected, with a moderate or even null association in the higher scores of moral analysis.




Figure 3. Philosophers' moral judgment capacity as a function of their moral analysis capacity. OLS regression line in blue and LOESS line in red. Points are jittered.

To further examine this relationship, we conducted two regression analyses – presented in models 3-4 in Table 3. Model 3 is a basic analysis, which examines this relationship without controlling for any other factor. It is the numerical representation of the linear line in Figure 3 and indicates a positive and significant relationship in which an increase of one point in the moral analysis ranking is associated with a 0.679 point increase in the moral judgment ranking. The moral analysis variable alone accounts for 24.8% of the variance in the views of philosophers regarding the ability to judge moral problems. Model 4 examines this relationship controlling for other individual-level factors and country differences. This model suggests that the relationship between moral analysis and judgment is retained even when controlling for other demographic and professional factors such as gender, age, position in a philosophy department, expertise in moral philosophy, and association with the continental or analytic

tradition.⁵ The relationship between moral analysis and judgment is more than five times stronger than the second strongest relationship included in this model – the analytic tradition (see the standardized model in Appendix III, which enables such a comparison of the strength of the relationships of moral judgment with different independent variables).

The positive and linear relationship between moral analysis and judgment is also retained when testing for nonlinear relationships (see Appendix III). To assess the robustness of the linear relationship between moral analysis and judgment, we conducted a series of regression analyses that estimate the interaction between moral analysis and a set of individual attributes in predicting moral judgment. We find no indication that this relationship varies across gender, age, membership in a philosophy department, work in the field of moral philosophy, association with the continental tradition, and public involvement level. However, we do find that this relationship is estimated as 10% weaker among analytic philosophers, yet even among this sub-group the relationship between moral analysis and judgment is positive and significant.

Personal and Professional Predictors

To examine personal and professional predictors of philosophers' beliefs regarding moral expertise, Table 3 presents four regression models using such factors as explanatory variables. Model 1 examines the relationships between these factors and the ranking of philosophers' moral analysis capacity, and Model 2 estimates their relationships with the ranking of philosophers' moral judgment capacity (see Appendix III for standardized versions of these models). Inspecting these results side by side helps to compare the relationships between the two dimensions of moral expertise.

The two models include country fixed-effects, which control for participants' countries of residence, allowing us to focus only on explanations at the individual level by controlling for cultural or contextual variations at the country level. Such an analysis is useful because it is reasonable that some individual-level variables are associated with certain cultural differences (e.g., the analytic tradition with Anglo-Saxon countries). It also enables us to control for potential over-representation of some countries to the extent it exists in our data.

⁵ This relationship is also retained when controlling for all the personal and professional variables available in our dataset (see Appendix III).

Table 3. Regression models for moral analysis and moral judgment as a function of personal and professional factors.

	<i>Moral Analysis</i>		<i>Moral Judgment</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Moral Analysis			0.679*** (0.018)	0.705*** (0.018)
Men	-0.294*** (0.047)	-0.260*** (0.063)		-0.053 (0.054)
Age	-0.007*** (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)		0.010*** (0.002)
Philosophy Department	0.034 (0.042)	0.094 (0.057)		0.070 (0.049)
Moral Philosophy	0.236*** (0.043)	0.264*** (0.058)		0.098* (0.050)
Analytic Tradition	0.179*** (0.045)	-0.217*** (0.061)		-0.343*** (0.052)
Continental Tradition	0.032 (0.044)	0.103 (0.060)		0.081 (0.051)
Public Involvement	0.029* (0.013)	0.078*** (0.017)		0.058*** (0.015)
Constant	5.915*** (0.160)	3.936*** (0.216)	0.524*** (0.109)	-0.232 (0.214)
Country Fixed-Effect	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	4,087	4,087	4,087	4,087
R ²	0.085	0.097	0.248	0.342
Adjusted R ²	0.061	0.074	0.248	0.325
Residual Std. Error	1.262 (df = 3984)	1.706 (df = 3984)	1.537 (df = 4085)	1.456 (df = 3983)
F Statistic	3.618*** (df = 102; 3984)	4.191*** (df = 102; 3984)	1,350.690*** (df = 1; 4085)	20.113*** (df = 103; 3983)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Models 1 and 2 suggest that men are more skeptical than women regarding both moral analysis and judgment capacities of philosophers, and tend to rank these capacities lower (by 0.294 points and 0.260, respectively). Additionally, we find that older respondents tend to rank philosophers' moral analysis lower while ranking philosophers' moral judgment capacities higher. Each year decreases the ranking for moral analysis by 0.007 points while increasing the ranking for moral judgment by 0.005 points. However, while this effect of age is statistically significant, it might not be substantially important: a difference of 30 years in the age of two philosophers is estimated to decrease moral analysis ranking by 0.21 points and increase the moral judgment ranking by 0.15 points (on a 7-point scale).

When focusing on professional factors, we can see that affiliation with a philosophy department as well as association with the continental tradition are not significant predictors of respondents' beliefs regarding both dimensions of moral expertise. In contrast, working in the field of moral philosophy and the level of public involvement are associated with stronger beliefs in philosophers' ability both to analyze and judge moral problems. Respondents who identify as working in the field of moral philosophy ranked philosophers' moral analysis and judgment abilities higher, by 0.236 and 0.264 points, respectively. Each additional reported public activity increases the ranking of moral analysis by 0.029 points and moral judgment by 0.078 points. Lastly, association with the analytic tradition predicts stronger beliefs in philosophers' moral analysis capacity (by 0.179 points), and weaker beliefs in their moral judgment capacity (by 0.217 points).⁶

The standardized versions of these analyses (see Appendix III) enable us to assess the relative strength of these associations. Focusing only on statistically significant predictors, we can see that gender and work in the field of moral philosophy are the strongest predictors of evaluations of moral analysis ability. Public involvement is the weakest predictor of this evaluation – approximately three times weaker compared to gender. Considering beliefs regarding moral judgment ability, working in the field of moral philosophy and public involvement are the strongest predictors (with nearly equal strength), and then gender and association with the analytic tradition. The weakest significant predictor is age.

Discussion

In this paper, we offer an empirical perspective on the debate over philosophers' moral expertise. We relied on a novel international dataset, involving 4,087 philosophers from 96 countries, to examine their beliefs on this subject. For this purpose, we developed a conceptual framework, which maps the views on this subject into a two-dimensional matrix. These two dimensions – the capacity of philosophers to analyze and to judge moral problems – were used to operationalize the measurements of philosophers' beliefs.

Our analysis of these beliefs is threefold. First, we explore the two-dimensional distribution of philosophers' views on moral expertise. Second, we explore the relationship

⁶ We focus on these factors because we believe that they are the central ones from a theoretical perspective. See Appendix III for examination of additional personal and professional factors.

between philosophers' beliefs regarding the capacities to analyze and judge moral problems. Lastly, we identify the personal and professional predictors of these beliefs. In this concluding section, we summarize our findings on each of these aspects, and discuss their potential implications.

First, the distribution of philosophers' beliefs regarding moral expertise highlights the two main camps in the debate – the views that philosophers are either narrow or broad moral experts (supported by 38.88% and 49.45% of respondents, respectively). The third view, which holds that philosophers are not moral experts, i.e., lack an advantage in both of these capacities, is held by a relatively small minority (estimated at 10.7%). As conceptually argued, the option that philosophers are better moral judges but not better moral analyzers is not a viable one, and our findings indeed support this as less than 1% of respondents reported holding such beliefs. Furthermore, the empirical picture highlights that the crux of the debate is not whether philosophers are better moral analyzers, rather whether they are also better moral judges.

These findings can primarily be of great sociological interest. They map the views of a global sample of philosophers regarding the ancient question of the merit of philosophy, reflect what philosophers think their profession enables them to do, and consequently, what they might contribute to society. As our findings indicate, for its practitioners, philosophy is not merely an abstract reflection, but also an endeavor that facilitates moral capabilities that can be of use to handle the moral problems we confront in our daily lives.

Furthermore, as Bourget and Chalmers explain, sometimes sociological facts about what philosophers believe play a methodological role in philosophical arguments, for example, by determining which claims can be used as premises of arguments and which ones requires considerable justifications. “Insofar as sociological beliefs play this role within philosophy”, they maintain, “it is better for them to be accurate” (Bourget and Chalmers 2014, 466). Our findings present the most comprehensive account of philosophers' beliefs on moral expertise to date. The fact that almost 90% of philosophers believe in their ability to analyze moral problems might help to focus further debates on what they disagree about – their ability to better judge moral problems.

We may carefully consider the possibility that the distribution of philosophers' beliefs can also play an evidential role in discerning philosophical truths. On the one hand, philosophers, more than others, may be best suited to accurately evaluate the merits and limitations of their capabilities. They have gained extensive experience in reflecting on

philosophical matters, thus they might better understand what a philosophical inquiry requires and how well they have successfully handled similar inquiries in the past. Their beliefs might express collective wisdom that indicates what the right answers are. As an illustration, the fact that many physicians, with years of experience in medicine, similarly diagnose our condition, gives us good reasons to believe that they are right in their diagnosis. We also have good reasons to believe that physicians will better know their merits and limitations. The finding that the majority of philosophers believe that their training and experience grant them better ability to both analyze and judge moral problems offers some evidence in favor of this view.

On the other hand, the fact that many believe that a proposition is true does not guarantee its truthfulness. Even if all philosophers accept a specific view, it does not bar the possibility that they might all be wrong. For example, they might overestimate their and their colleagues' capabilities due to overconfidence and vanity. After all, they are motivated to believe that they possess such moral capabilities. Unfortunately, it is not easy to empirically assess whether philosophers are indeed better judges of moral problems. In contrast to many other domains of expertise, in morality we do not have any clear empirical evidence for the success of moral judgments (McGrath 2008). Several studies have tried to overcome this problem using proxy criteria such as reliability (e.g., Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012; Tobia, Buckwalter, and Stich 2013; Tobia, Chapman, and Stich 2013; Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2015; Horvath and Wiegmann 2021) and convergence (Statman et al. 2020). However, they present mixed findings and some of these studies were also criticized for using unsuitable criteria that experts in other domains would also fail to satisfy (Buckwalter 2016; Bach 2019).

Hence, better evaluation of the potential evidential role of our findings requires further research, including comparison with other experts. Studies of experts in domains where clearer empirical standards for evaluating expert performance exist might help clarify to what extent experts overestimate their professional abilities. Indeed, experts' potential overconfidence has attracted much attention in the research on expertise. However, the conclusions are subtle as experts sometimes express overconfidence, but variations exist across domains and tasks (e.g., Kahneman and Klein 2009). It is also unclear which studies or experts can be used as a valid analogy to philosophers. For example, many studies of expert judgment focus on predictive tasks (i.e., judgments about future events), which are dissimilar to common philosophical tasks (Bach 2019). Therefore, comparison of philosophers with other experts requires detailed examination that is beyond the scope of this paper.

The second aspect we explored in this study is how philosophers perceived the relationship between the two dimensions of moral expertise – the abilities to analyze and judge moral problems. We found that regardless of participants’ particular beliefs, a clear relationship was found between the two. In other words, philosophers’ evaluations of their moral judgment capacity strongly depend on their beliefs regarding their moral analysis capacity. This relationship is consistent across all the examined subgroups of philosophers, including age, gender, and professional attributes. The narrow view, which holds that philosophers are moral analyzers but not moral judges, is a clear deviation from this overall pattern as it rejects this relationship.

Our findings offer support for Niv’s (forthcoming) recent critique of the narrow view, which argues that its denial of the relationship between the capacities to morally analyze and judge is inconsistent and counter-intuitive. While Niv’s argument is mostly theoretical, based on arguments from epistemology and psychology, we offer empirical evidence for the collective intuition regarding the relationship between these two capacities. Notably, the problem of philosophers’ potential vanity or overconfidence in assessing their capabilities is irrelevant in this case. These findings express a collective agreement on the existence of a relationship between moral analysis and judgment capacities, not on the degree to which philosophers possess them. Even respondents who believe that philosophers do not possess these capacities believe on average that the two are related.

Lastly, we identify some personal and professional predictors of philosophers’ beliefs about moral expertise. Older philosophers tend to be more skeptical about moral analysis ability, and more optimistic about moral judgment. Men tend to be more skeptical about both capacities. As for the professional factors, working in the field of moral philosophy and public advisory activity are associated with higher confidence in philosophers’ ability to analyze and judge moral problems. In contrast, association with the analytic tradition tends to strengthen the belief in philosophers’ moral analysis capacity while weakening the belief in their moral judgment capacity, resulting in a tendency toward the narrow view.

These findings contribute to recent attempts in experimental philosophy to examine what shapes philosophers’ beliefs (e.g., Bourget and Chalmers 2014; Yaden and Anderson 2021). They can be further examined from empirical as well as philosophical perspectives. From an empirical perspective, they point to the potential of exploring the extent and nature of the causal relationships that underlie the specific predictors of philosophers’ beliefs we

identify, since the observational nature of our data does not permit causal inference. For example, the fact that moral philosophers are more inclined toward the broad view leaves open questions regarding the causal direction of these relationships. We therefore cannot tell whether working in the field of moral philosophy boosts philosophers' confidence in their moral abilities, or that people with such higher confidence choose to work in this field in the first place. From a philosophical perspective, the findings on the predictors of philosophers' beliefs may foster future discussions on their relevant influence on philosophical reasoning as studies in experimental philosophy have used similar findings to challenge the allegedly universal nature of such reasoning (e.g., Tobia 2016; De Cruz 2014; 2018; Yaden and Anderson 2021).

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Appendixes

Appendix I: The Participants and the Selection Procedure

Email list

The study was conducted among scholars who published philosophy or ethics articles, as they are categorized by the Web of Science database. Our email list was based on data that were retrieved on 16th January 2020 and included 139,446 records for the years 2010-2020. The records were written in 33 languages and most of them (72%) were written in English. Only 87,189 (62.5%) of these records contained one or more email addresses.

The validity of the Web of Science's classification is limited, and so is the email list of philosophers that was extracted from it. On the one hand, there are philosophical articles that were not indexed under the philosophy or ethics categories. Yet, it is enough to have only one record under these two categories to enter our email list. In other words, even if some of the scholar's publications were indexed inappropriately, it is enough that one of his publications was indexed correctly to enter the list. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that our email list is too exclusive. On the other hand, non-philosophical articles are indexed under the ethics or philosophy categories, for example, articles in moral psychology. These articles are written by non-philosophers who should not enter our final email list.

To filter out as many non-philosophers as possible, records were separated into two groups: single author records (68,564 / 78.6%) and multiple authors records (18,625 / 21.4%). 100 records were randomly selected from each group. Email addresses from these records were manually searched online for the professional identity of their owner. The search indicated that the sample of multiple author records consists of fewer philosophers than the sample of single-author records (28% vs. 79%).⁷ This finding should not be surprising due to the publishing culture in the discipline, which is more single author-oriented. For this reason, only single author records were used for this study. After removing duplicate email addresses, the final email list, which was used for inviting the participants to take part in our study, included 41,675 unique addresses.⁸

⁷ For some email addresses it was impossible to determine whether they belong to philosophers: some searches did not result in enough information and others were inconclusive (i.e., difficult to decide whether to categorize the scholar as a philosopher or not). In the single author group, 15% of the records were marked as "unknown", and 11% in the multiple authors group. Therefore, it is possible that the percentage of philosophers in each group is higher.

⁸ Additional email addresses belonging to the three participants of the pilot were removed.

Distribution

The invitations to fill out the questionnaire were distributed in two waves via Qualtrics's mailing system. A pilot distribution of 200 randomly selected email addresses took place on Monday, 25th May 2020. The main distribution took place a week later, on Monday, 1st June 2020. Reminders were sent at weekly intervals (three reminders for the pilot distribution and two for the main one). The survey was closed for all distributions on 1st July 2020.

A total number of 35,659 email addresses received the invitation to take part in the study (for different technical reasons, such as inactive email address or full inbox, 6,016 email addresses did not receive the invitation). Some of these email addresses belong to the same scholar. In other words, some scholars have several email addresses. To filter out such duplications, matches of first and last names were marked.⁹ 4,068 duplicate names were found. Each of these names was associated with at least 2 email addresses and up to 7 email addresses. Based on this calculation, we can estimate that 30,782 individual scholars received the invitation to our study.

As described above, we randomly sampled 100 email addresses in order to manually identify whether their holders are philosophers. We estimate that only 79% of the email addresses belong to philosophers (15% are unknown and 6% are of non-philosophers), so we can estimate that among those who received the invitation 24,318 to 28,935 were philosophers (the estimation varies based on how the unknown email addresses are distributed between philosophers and non-philosophers: from 0% of the unknowns belonging to philosophers to 100% of them).¹⁰

Completion rate

In total, we collected 5,217 responses (4,215 full responses and 1,002 partial responses. Additional 1,113 respondents opened the questionnaire but left without filling out the first question).

⁹ Identifying duplications by matches of first and last names is an inaccurate method for two reasons. First, there are differences in how these names are written in the database (for example, there are inconsistencies regarding middle names and sometimes the first and last names are transposed). Second, some scholars might share the same name. However, this method can be used for evaluating the possible scope of the problem.

¹⁰ A few respondents joined the study other than via direct email invitation. Three respondents participated in the pilot and the other received an invitation from colleagues.

The tenth question in the questionnaire asked about the respondent’s fields of expertise within philosophy and included an option to indicate that he or she is not a philosopher. All respondents who indicated that they are not philosophers or quit before this question were excluded from the analysis. A total number of 4,647 (full or partial) records remained. However, only 4,087 respondents finished the questions that are analyzed in this paper. The completion rate, calculated based on the estimated number of philosophers in the invitation list, is between 14.12% to 16.81%.

The distribution and selection procedure are summarized in the following table:

<i>Distribution</i>	<i>Distribution list</i>	41,675 email addresses
	<i>Invitations sent</i> <i>(i.e. excluding inactive or full email addresses)</i>	35,659 email addresses
	<i>Invited scholars</i> <i>(i.e., excluding potential multiple email addresses for each scholar)</i>	~30,782 individual scholars
	<i>Estimated number of invited philosophers</i> <i>(based on the share of philosophers in the randomized sample)</i>	24,318 to 28,935
<i>Response and completion</i>	<i>Total (full or partial)</i>	5,217
	<i>Philosophers’ responses</i>	4,647
	<i>Valid responses</i> <i>(i.e., full responses to the examined questions)</i>	4,087
	<i>Completion rate</i>	14.12% to 16.81%

Representativeness

We have a limited ability to determine how representative our sample is. Since the actual characteristics of the population of philosophers worldwide are unknown, we lack comparable standards. However, we conducted several analyses to test for potential selection bias in our sample. First, we examined attrition rates by comparing the differences between participants who fully completed the questionnaire and participants who partially completed it. The table below shows the proportions or means of central variables for the two sub-samples. As the table shows, for most variables, no significant differences exist between the two types of

participants. However, the percentage of men and analytic philosophers among respondents who fully completed the questionnaire is higher. There is also a difference in participants' level of public involvement between the two sub-samples. The average level of public involvement for participants who fully completed the questionnaire is lower (0.85 compared with 1.64). This finding can be explained by the fact that more involved philosophers were faced with a longer version of the questionnaire, possibly resulting in a higher tendency to quit before full completion. Therefore, our data potentially underrepresent more involved philosophers and over-represent men and analytic philosophers.

	<i>Partial Completion</i>		<i>Full Completion</i>		<i>Chi-Square</i>
	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	
Men	70.89	560	74.87	4,087	4.094**
Philosophy Department	52.86	560	53.85	4,087	0.194
Moral Philosophy	35.54	560	34.55	4,087	0.213
Analytic Tradition	40.55	550	48.79	4,087	13.188***
Continental Tradition	40.91	550	41.50	4,087	0.070

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01


	<i>Partial Completion</i>			<i>Full Completion</i>			<i>t</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>SD</i>	
Age	50.49	560	14.17	50.18	4,087	13.55	-0.505
Public Involvement	1.64	184	2.18	0.85	4,087	1.59	-6.472***

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Second, we leverage the reminders that were sent to potential participants in order to estimate the potential for differences between respondents and non-respondents as they might indicate self-selection. Differences in the characteristics of participants who needed no reminder, one reminder, or two, to complete the questionnaire can be used to infer the characteristics of invitees who did not participate in the study. For example, if a certain group of participants needed more (or fewer) reminders in order to answer the questionnaire, it might be inferred that such a group is more (or less) difficult to sample and might be underrepresented (or overrepresented) in our data. The following figure shows the proportions or means of several central variables based on the number of reminders participants needed to respond to the questionnaire. In all these examined variables, we can see that there are no significant

differences between the characteristics of participants who respond to the questionnaire after the initial invitation, first, or second reminders.

(Proportions are displayed for the following variables: Gender (men), Philosophy Department, Moral Philosophy, Analytic Tradition, and Continental Tradition. Means are displayed for Age and Public Involvement. 95% confidence intervals are calculated accordingly).



Appendix II: Measurements

Moral analysis and judgment

In general, to what extent do you think philosophers, by virtue of their professional knowledge, can...

	1 Not at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 Extensi vely
Identify decisions that have moral aspects or implications?	<input type="radio"/>						
Identify the moral values at stake or in conflict?	<input type="radio"/>						
Map the moral implications of different courses of action?	<input type="radio"/>						
Point out the morally correct decision/action?	<input type="radio"/>						

Public involvement

Philosophers are sometimes formally consulted by various institutions or organizations, most notably being asked to serve as committee members, as advisors, or in other capacities. They are invited to do so due to their professional expertise as philosophers. Such involvement may include (but is not restricted to):

- Being a member of a policy advisory committee
- Testifying in court or in the legislature
- Advising non-profit or private organizations
- Serving on an ethics committee in a university, hospital, etc.

(Note: Civic and administrative obligations — e.g., jury duty, academic workshops, conferences, or lectures — are excluded.)

Please try to recall all the cases in which you were socially or publicly involved in these specific ways. Then, go to the next page, where you will be asked about these cases.

Please list all such cases in which you were involved due to your professional expertise as a philosopher in the last 10 years. In the sections that follow, you will be asked a few additional questions about each of them. (Note: You can name the cases in specific or general terms, for example, “Member of the Johns Hopkins hospital ethics committee” or “Member of a hospital ethics committee”).

Appendix III: Additional Regression Models

Standardized regression models for moral analysis and moral judgment

The following table presents standardized versions of the regression models presented in Table 3 in the paper. These models enable a comparison of the relative effect of each independent variable, which is not possible when each variable is in its original and distinct scale. From model 1 we can learn, for example, that gender (men) is the most influential factor on moral analysis, and its influence is almost three time bigger than the influence of public involvement. However, public involvement and work in the field of moral philosophy are the two most influential factors in moral judgment when moral analysis is not included in the model (model 2). From model 3 we can learn that moral analysis has the greatest effect on moral judgment, and this effect is more than five times bigger than the second most influential factor – association with the analytic tradition.

	<i>Moral Analysis</i>		<i>Moral Judgment</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Moral Analysis			0.518***	
			(0.013)	
Men	-0.098***	-0.064***	-0.013	
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.013)	
Age	-0.071***	0.038*	0.074***	
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	
Philosophy Department	0.013	0.026*	0.020	
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	
Moral Philosophy	0.086***	0.071***	0.026*	
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)	
Analytic Tradition	0.069***	-0.061***	-0.097***	
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	
Continental Tradition	0.012	0.029	0.022	
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)	
Public Involvement	0.035*	0.070***	0.052***	
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)	
Constant	-0.156	-0.177	-0.096	
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.085)	
Country Fixed-Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	4,087	4,087	4,087	
R ²	0.085	0.097	0.342	
Adjusted R ²	0.061	0.074	0.325	
Residual Std. Error	0.969	0.962	0.821	
	(df = 3984)	(df = 3984)	(df = 3983)	
F Statistic	3.618***	4.191***	20.113***	
	(df = 102; 3984)	(df = 102; 3984)	(df = 103; 3983)	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Regression models for moral analysis and judgment with additional individual-level variables

The following table presents regression models for moral analysis and moral judgment with all the available personal and professional variables in our dataset. They are more comprehensive models than those we presented in Table 3 in the paper. We can learn from these models that the significant influence of the reported personal and professional attributes that were found in Table 3 (gender, age, work in the field of moral philosophy, association with the analytic tradition, and public involvement) retain their significant effect even when controlling for additional personal and professional information. We can also see from model 3 that the strong and linear relationship between moral analysis and moral judgment is retained when controlling for such additional information.

		<i>Moral Analysis</i>		<i>Moral Judgment</i>	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Moral Analysis			0.706***	(0.018)
	Men	-0.280***	-0.249***	-0.051	(0.054)
	Age	-0.006**	0.009***	0.013***	(0.002)
Rank (Baseline - Professor Emeritus)	Full Professor (or equivalent)	-0.039	0.066	0.094	(0.109)
	Associate Professor (or equivalent)	0.051	0.116	0.080	(0.123)
	Assistant Professor (or equivalent)	0.016	0.205	0.194	(0.139)
	Postdoctoral researcher	-0.032	0.301	0.323*	(0.152)
	Ph.D. student/candidate	0.002	0.263	0.262	(0.188)
	Adjunct professor	-0.079	-0.002	0.054	(0.160)
	Independent researcher	-0.164	0.287	0.403**	(0.149)
	Other	-0.090	0.109	0.173	(0.156)
Institution	University	-0.073	0.228	0.279*	(0.114)
	College	-0.021	0.188	0.203*	(0.124)
	Research Institution	-0.131	-0.120	-0.028	(0.094)
	Government Agency	0.230	0.366	0.204	(0.178)
	NGO	0.050	0.009	-0.026	(0.141)

	Private Sector	-0.061 (0.128)	-0.096 (0.173)	-0.053 (0.147)
	Other	-0.043 (0.107)	-0.115 (0.144)	-0.084 (0.123)
<hr/>				
Department	Philosophy	-0.001 (0.072)	-0.095 (0.097)	-0.094 (0.083)
	Political Science	-0.077 (0.098)	-0.151 (0.132)	-0.096 (0.113)
	Law	-0.018 (0.112)	-0.269 (0.152)	-0.257* (0.130)
	Bioethics	-0.045 (0.110)	-0.042 (0.148)	-0.010 (0.126)
	Other	-0.036 (0.073)	-0.153 (0.099)	-0.128 (0.084)
<hr/>				
Field of Expertise	Metaphysics	0.056 (0.052)	0.171* (0.070)	0.131* (0.060)
	Epistemology	-0.084 (0.052)	-0.050 (0.070)	0.010 (0.059)
	Logic	-0.128 (0.072)	0.063 (0.097)	0.153 (0.083)
	Moral Philosophy	0.212*** (0.045)	0.289*** (0.061)	0.139** (0.052)
	Political Philosophy	0.017 (0.049)	-0.104 (0.067)	-0.116* (0.057)
	Aesthetics	0.031 (0.064)	0.039 (0.087)	0.017 (0.074)
	Philosophy of Science	-0.066 (0.052)	-0.097 (0.070)	-0.051 (0.060)
<hr/>				
Tradition	Continental	0.021 (0.046)	0.110 (0.062)	0.095 (0.053)
	Analytic	0.187*** (0.047)	-0.213*** (0.064)	-0.345*** (0.054)
	History of Ideas	-0.107* (0.046)	-0.075 (0.063)	0.001 (0.054)
<hr/>				
Public Involvement	Public Involvement	0.031* (0.013)	0.086*** (0.018)	0.064*** (0.016)
<hr/>				
	Constant	6.027*** (0.244)	3.565*** (0.330)	-0.689* (0.302)
<hr/>				
	Observations	4,087	4,087	4,087
	Country Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
	R ²	0.092	0.105	0.349
	Adjusted R ²	0.062	0.076	0.327
	Residual Std. Error	1.261 (df = 3958)	1.704 (df = 3958)	1.454 (df = 3957)
	F Statistic	3.119*** (df = 128; 3958)	3.610*** (df = 128; 3958)	16.424*** (df = 129; 3957)

Notes:

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Estimating the relationship between moral analysis and moral judgment across individual attributes

To assess the robustness of the linear relationship between moral analysis and judgment as presented in Table 3 in the paper, we conducted a series of regression analyses that estimate the interaction between moral analysis and a set of individual attributes in predicting moral judgment. The following tables present results of these analyses. The first table presents the estimation of such interactions without controlling for other variables. The second table presents the estimation of the same interactions while controlling for additional personal and professional information (models 1-7) and when controlling for all the tested interactions together (model 8).

We find no indication that the relationship between moral analysis and moral judgment varies across gender, age, membership in a philosophy department, work in the field of moral philosophy, association with the continental tradition, and public involvement. However, we do find that this relationship is estimated as 10% weaker among analytic philosophers, yet even among this sub-group the relationship between moral analysis and judgment is positive and significant.

	<i>Moral Judgment</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Moral Analysis	0.673*** (0.039)	0.717*** (0.068)	0.714*** (0.026)	0.691*** (0.022)	0.735*** (0.024)	0.714*** (0.024)	0.684*** (0.020)
Men	-0.212 (0.267)						
Age		0.013* (0.007)					
Philosophy Department			0.158 (0.214)				
Moral Philosophy				0.080 (0.239)			
Analytic Tradition					0.030 (0.218)		
Continental Tradition						0.456** (0.216)	
Public Involvement							0.012 (0.075)
Moral Analysis*Men	0.025 (0.044)						
Moral Analysis*Age		-0.0002 (0.001)					
Moral Analysis*Philosophy Department			-0.036 (0.036)				
Moral Analysis*Moral Philosophy				0.003 (0.040)			
Moral Analysis*Analytic Tradition					-0.072** (0.037)		
Moral Analysis*Continental Tradition						-0.043 (0.036)	
Moral Analysis*Public Involvement							0.011 (0.012)
Constant	0.390 (0.282)	-0.522 (0.427)	0.117 (0.213)	0.199 (0.195)	0.199 (0.202)	0.044 (0.203)	0.218 (0.189)
Country Fixed-Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,087	4,087	4,087	4,087	4,087	4,087	4,087
R ²	0.321	0.329	0.321	0.322	0.333	0.324	0.326
Adjusted R ²	0.305	0.312	0.305	0.305	0.316	0.308	0.309
Residual Std. Error (df = 3988)	1.478	1.470	1.478	1.478	1.466	1.475	1.473
F Statistic (df = 98; 3988)	19.263***	19.911***	19.269***	19.295***	20.279***	19.527***	19.662***

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.001

	<i>Moral Judgment</i>							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Moral Analysis	0.673*** (0.038)	0.721*** (0.067)	0.727*** (0.026)	0.705*** (0.022)	0.735*** (0.024)	0.729*** (0.024)	0.699*** (0.020)	0.792*** (0.082)
Men	-0.293 (0.263)	-0.053 (0.054)	-0.052 (0.054)	-0.053 (0.054)	-0.050 (0.054)	-0.053 (0.054)	-0.052 (0.054)	-0.306 (0.265)
Age	0.010*** (0.002)	0.011 (0.007)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.015** (0.007)
Philosophy Department	0.070 (0.049)	0.070 (0.049)	0.314 (0.212)	0.070 (0.049)	0.070 (0.048)	0.069 (0.048)	0.069 (0.049)	0.186 (0.220)
Moral Philosophy	0.098** (0.050)	0.098** (0.050)	0.098** (0.050)	0.116 (0.236)	0.100** (0.050)	0.099** (0.050)	0.097* (0.050)	0.080 (0.238)
Analytic Tradition	-0.345*** (0.053)	-0.343*** (0.053)	-0.345*** (0.053)	-0.343*** (0.052)	0.078 (0.217)	-0.348*** (0.053)	-0.343*** (0.052)	0.173 (0.231)
Continental Tradition	0.081 (0.051)	0.081 (0.051)	0.080 (0.051)	0.081 (0.051)	0.076 (0.051)	0.409* (0.213)	0.081 (0.051)	0.526** (0.219)
Public Involvement	0.058*** (0.015)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.007 (0.075)	-0.003 (0.075)
Moral Analysis*Men	0.040 (0.043)							0.044 (0.044)
Moral Analysis*Age		-0.0003 (0.001)						-0.001 (0.001)
Moral Analysis*Philosophy Department			-0.042 (0.036)					-0.020 (0.037)
Moral Analysis*Moral Philosophy				-0.003 (0.039)				0.003 (0.040)
Moral Analysis*Analytic Tradition					-0.073** (0.036)			-0.091** (0.039)
Moral Analysis*Continental Tradition						-0.057 (0.036)		-0.079** (0.037)
Moral Analysis*Public Involvement							0.009 (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)
Constant	-0.040 (0.297)	-0.323 (0.428)	-0.357 (0.239)	-0.237 (0.224)	-0.406* (0.231)	-0.366 (0.230)	-0.196 (0.220)	-0.723 (0.508)
Country Fixed-Effect	Yes							
Observations	4,087	4,087	4,087	4,087	4,087	4,087	4,087	4,087
R ²	0.342	0.342	0.342	0.342	0.343	0.343	0.342	0.344
Adjusted R ²	0.325	0.325	0.325	0.325	0.326	0.325	0.325	0.326
Residual Std. Error	1.456 (df = 3982)	1.456 (df = 3982)	1.456 (df = 3982)	1.456 (df = 3982)	1.455 (df = 3982)	1.456 (df = 3982)	1.456 (df = 3982)	1.455 (df = 3976)
F Statistic	19.927*** (df = 104; 3982)	19.915*** (df = 104; 3982)	19.935*** (df = 104; 3982)	19.914*** (df = 104; 3982)	19.973*** (df = 104; 3982)	19.951*** (df = 104; 3982)	19.921*** (df = 104; 3982)	18.949*** (df = 110; 3976)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.001